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A bstractSince its passage, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
has grown to over 8,000 pages of proposed and final rules and regulations. For any bank, compliance 
with that volume is a challenge, but for a small bank, it can have far-reaching consequences. This 
project analyzes possible effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on financial services providers, specifically 
Main Street banks, otherwise known as community banks. In an effort to create a safer and more 
stable financial institutional environment, the Dodd-Frank Act added levels of regulation never seen 
since the Great Depression. This level of regulation can have negative impacts on community banks in 
the form of increased regulatory capital, increased non-interest expense, decreased amount of loans, 
and lower returns on equity.
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An Analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act 
and Its Impact on Community Banks
An Honors Capstone
Introduction
Theories on modern welfare claim that government intervention is necessary to uphold 
structure and find economic inefficiencies in markets. These inefficiencies theoretically cause 
markets to fail in producing maximum prosperity. Government intervention has tradeoffs but is 
believed to ultimately promote the common good and benefit society overall. We see 
government intervention in the everyday with federal regulations and its impacts and tradeoffs 
have been studied with mixed results (Bivens). Some studies have found that regulation stunts 
free market growth and causes negative changes in prices, production, and employment (Bivens). 
Other studies have found positive effects of regulation in areas that promote property rights and 
contract enforcement (Bivens). This unclear argument can be carried over to the Dodd-Frank 
Act.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into federal 
law in July of 2010, was enacted to “create a sound economic foundation to grow jobs, protect 
consumers, rein in Wall Street and big bonuses, end bailouts and Too Big to Fail, [and] prevent 
another financial crisis” (“Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
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Protection Act”). In theory, the Dodd-Frank Act is supposed to lower the risk of a future 
Financial Crisis. Any intrinsic costs of additional regulation against banks are presumably offset 
by the benefits of a safe and stable financial system. However, the benefits of regulation and 
their consequences are not clear. This Capstone project analyzes possible effects of the Dodd- 
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on financial services providers, 
specifically Main Street banks, otherwise known as community banks. The Act is an effort to 
create accountability and transparency. However, the Dodd-Frank Act could have negative 
consequences on bank operations, bank compliance, bank financials, as well as other aspects for 
community banks which are now forced to comply with more extensive regulation than ever 
before.
Literary Background
Since its passage, the Dodd-Frank Act has spawned over 8,000 pages of proposed and 
final rules and regulations (“ABA Dodd-Frank Tracker”). Managing such a massive amount of 
regulation is a challenge for any bank. But for a small bank, it can have far-reaching 
consequences. Although much of the Dodd-Frank Act excuses community banks from most 
provisions, according to the American Bankers Association, there are still several critical issues 
for community banks to consider. These include risk retention, higher capital requirements and 
narrower qualifications for capital, and increasing compliance costs (“Cumulative Weight of 
New Regulations”). Community banks are now subject to additional registration and oversight 
burden by the SEC (“Cumulative Weight of New Regulations”). In combination, this legislation
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could harm smaller banks by imposing higher operating costs to comply with many new rules 
and by placing limits on capital (“Cumulative Weight o f New Regulations”).
American Bankers Association Chairman-Elect and an Oklahoma community banker 
himself, Albert Kelly addressed Congress in 2011 about the harm Dodd-Frank will have on 
community banks. He stated that “The Dodd-Frank Act will raise costs, reduce income and limit 
potential growth, all o f which drives capital away from banking, restricts access to credit for 
individuals and business, reduces financial resources that create new jobs, and retards growth in 
the economy” (Kelly). Kelly forewarned Congress that “the lack of earnings potential, regulatory 
fatigue, lack o f access to capital, limited resources to compete, inability to enhance shareholder 
value and return on investment, all push community banks to sell [their banks]” (Kelly).
Acting FDIC Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg, who is also concerned about the future of 
community banking, stated to the American Bankers Association in 2011:
W
It is important to recognize that community banks play a critical role not only in the 
financial system, but also in the U.S. economy as a whole. While community banks 
with assets under $1 billion represent less than 11 percent of banking assets, they 
provide nearly 40 percent of the loans the banking industry makes to small 
businesses, extending credit that is crucial to job creation. [...] They have a unique 
role to play in our financial system.
(“Community Banking Initiatives”)
Different organizations have completed research exploring the effects the Dodd-Frank 
Act will have on community banks. Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck’s study in May o f 2012 
found that Investment bankers and financial industry consultants estimated Dodd-Frank would
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\^ /  lower the return on equity o f community banks with less than $500 million in assets to between 6 
- 8% (Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck). They state that normally, bank investors look for returns 
near 11 - 14% (Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck). In addition, another study, this one conducted 
by the Federal Reserve Bank o f Richmond, estimated that these changes in capital requirements 
may limit the pool o f potential investors for raising equity (Powers).
Banks, when creating loans, must now hold on to a higher percentage o f risk for the life 
of the loan than before. Meaning the banks cannot sell or securitize as much o f the loan as 
previous to reduce the bank’s own exposure to risk. According to a report conducted by 
American Bankers Association, the Tier 1 Minimum Ratios could be raised as high as 9.5%, 
which would increase the expense of those loans to the consumers as banks have to hold higher 
levels o f capital in reserve (“Dodd-Frank and Community Banks”). Higher regulatory capital 
v , requirements means banks need more equity funding versus debt funding. With equity being
more expensive than debt, this could limit the number of loans that small community banks can 
afford to give out. The report by the ABA stated that “some community banks may stop 
providing mortgages altogether as the requirements and compliance costs make such a service 
unreasonable without considerable volume” (“Dodd-Frank and Community Banks”). Limiting 
the number of loans issued creates a tighter lending climate, a concern Ben Bemanke, the 
Chairman of the Board o f Governors o f the Federal Reserve System, addressed last November. 
He stated that “overly tight lending standards may now be preventing creditworthy borrowers 




The FDIC conducted a report specifically studying how Dodd-Frank affects community 
banks. It found that no new community banks have been chartered since 2011 “due in large part 
to Dodd-Frank” (“FDIC Community Banking Study”). They also estimate that the U.S. will have 
1000 less community banks by 2020, either by banks shutting down because of compliance costs 
or by community banks merging or acquiring each other (“FDIC Community Banking Study”).
A unique section o f the study involves interviews with several presidents of community banks. 
These presidents have stated that banks are increasingly relying on outside consultants and 
lawyers, hiring staff to manage the new regulation and are experiencing enormous increases in 
their compliance and non-interest costs (“FDIC Community Banking Study”).
Despite the research and claims above, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
issued a report in September of 2012 on the impacts o f Dodd-Frank on community banks 
acknowledging that much of the law’s impact is unknown either because not enough time has 
passed or because not enough o f the law is active and ready to use (“Community Banks and 
Credit Unions”). Although effects from Dodd-Frank are mostly speculative, the majority of the 
research and opinions address common consequences for community banks which include 




This project analyzes the effects the Dodd-Frank Act could have on Main Street, or 
community banks. As specified by Congress, the difference between a Wall Street bank and a 
Main Street bank is based on total assets (“Banking Information and Regulation'’). According to 
the Federal Reserve, Table 1 describes the type of bank based on the level of total assets.
Table 1: Bank Type by Peer Group and Total Assets
Type of Bank Level of Total Assets Corresponding Peer Group
Systematically Important $50 billion or greater Peer Group 1
Large $10 billion or greater Peer Group 1
Small, Community Less than $10 billion Peer Groups 2, 3, 4, & 5
Source: “Bank Information and Regulation;” FFIEC Website vvvvw.ffiec.gov
In order to obtain large amounts of data from thousands of banks, the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) website is used. It houses the National Information 
Center and contains Bank Holding Company Peer Reports. This data divides banks based on 
their level of assets, allowing an easy distinction between Systemically Important or Large banks 
and Community banks. There are eight peer groups based on total assets. Peer group 1 includes 
large and systematically important banks with assets over $10 billion. Peer group 2 has total 
assets of $3 billion - $10 billion, Peer group 3 has $1 billion to $3 billion in total assets, Peer 
group 4 has $500 million to $1 billion in total assets, and Peer group 5 has less than $500 
million. Peer groups 6 and 7 were discontinued, having been combined with other peer groups 
over the last decade, and Peer group 9 included atypical banks that had been moved from other
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peer groups. Peer groups 1, 6, 7, and 9 were not included in this report. For this study, we focus 
on Peer Groups 2 through 5 for the years 2007 to 2011.
Using the BCH Peer Report documents, various Balance Sheet and Income Statement 
items are used to show changes the Dodd-Frank Act may have made on community banks, such 
as change in capital and change in non-interest expenses. These items include Net Loan and 
Leases, Capital Ratios, Return on Equity, Net Interest Income, and Non-Interest Income, among 
a list of others. A summary of the expected effect of Dodd-Frank Act on various items is 
presented in Table 2:





Return on Equity Decrease
Results from Data 
Capital
One of the concerns for community banks is the amount of capital needed to offset risk is 
significantly increasing. The question is, whether small community banks can handle the 
increase in regulatory capital; each dollar spent on regulatory capital is one less dollar that can be 
spent on additional loans and therefore, possible income from interest. In addition, equity 
funding that is needed for these increases in capital is more expensive than debt funding, which
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is another possible burden community banks will have to try to carry. Table 3 and Graph 1 
concentrate on Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital and Total Risk-Based Capital Ratios because they are 
specified by the Dodd-Frank Act. Currently, the Dodd-Frank Act requires each bank to have a 
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio of 8% and a Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio of 4%. From 2007 
to 2011, all peer groups were exceeding these requirements.
Table 3: Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital & Total Risk-Based Capital by Peer Group
Peer Group 2 Peer Group 3 Peer Group 4 Peer Group 5
Tier 1 Total Tier 1 Total Tier 1 Total Tier 1 Total
RBC (%) RBC (%) RBC (%) RBC (%) RBC (%) RBC (%) RBC (%) RBC (%)
2007 10.73 12.38 10.91 12.35 11.74 13.01 12.86 14.25
2008 11.15 12.94 10.67 12.20 11.17 12.57 11.90 13.33
2009 12.38 14.12 11.51 13.13 11.54 13.11 10.17 11.80
2010 13.96 15.60 12.81 14.41 12.61 14.14 10.69 12.31
2011 15.22 16.74 13.89 15.43 13.65 15.20 10.54 12.05
Overall 41.85% 35.22% 27.31% 24.94% 16.27% 16.83% -18.04% -15.44%
A%
Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website vvwvv.ffiec.gov
Graph l: Total Risk-Based Capital by Peer Group
Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov
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As expected, when examining the capital ratios above, we see that capital has grown 
between the years 2007 and 2011. Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio and Total Risk-Based Capital 
Ratio have grown between 41.85% and 35.22% respectively from 2007 to 2011 in Peer 2 with 
similar increases in the other Peer groups as well. The only group not following this pattern is 
Peer group 5, who actually sees a decrease in capital ratios. Interestingly, as the peer groups 
decrease in total assets size, the overall percentage change in the level of capital also decreases. 
Historically, regulation proposals have been lenient on smaller banks allowing them to have less 
capital protection among other aspects. The underlying assumption is that smaller banks can fail 
without harming the financial market as a whole. Therefore, smaller banks are seen as less risky. 
Peer group 5 could be an example of this exception to the capital requirements. In addition, the 
study conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, estimated that changes in capital 
requirements may limit the pool of potential investors for raising equity (Powers). As a result, 
this large decrease seen in the smaller banks may be the result o f the tough environment for 
raising capital. Lastly, another possible explanation is the number of problem banks in Peer 
group 5. While the number o f banks in each peer has either stayed constant or even grown 
between years 2007 and 2011, Peer group 5 is the only peer group to reduce in number of banks. 
In 2007, it contained 101 banks; in 2011, it only contains 80. These problem banks could be 
driving capital down.
Graph 1 demonstrates how each bank has met and exceeded the capital requirements 
placed by the Dodd-Frank Act; the graphs for Total Risk-Based capital and Tier 1 Risk-Based 
capital show identical movements from 2007 to 2011 by the peer groups. The Dodd-Frank 
introduced more stringent regulatory capital requirements, causing banks to “bulk up” on equity
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for the safety of the bank and the financial institutional environment. The data above reinforces 
the claim by American Bankers Association. In their report, they claim that banks must now hold 
on to a higher percentage of risk for the life of the loan than before, meaning the banks cannot 
sell or securitize as much of the loan as previous to reduce the bank's own exposure to risk. This 
would increase the expense of those loans to the consumers as banks have to hold higher levels 
of capital in reserve (“Dodd-Frank and Community Banks"). The capital levels have all risen.
Non-Interest Expense
Compliance costs are causing huge increases to non-interest expense, according to the 
interviews of presidents from community banks conducted by FDIC. These increases in Non- 
Interest Expense could be the factor that causes some banks to close or consolidate with other 
hurting community banks. Smaller banks might have to hire outside consultants to manage new 
regulation, a cost that might not be feasible for them.
Although all peer groups did see an increase in non-interest expense, these increases were 
significantly different for each peer group. Looking at Table 4, you will see that between the 
years 2007 and 2011, Peer group 2 saw an overall increase of non-interest expense of 0.69%.
Peer group 3, however, saw a much higher increase of about 8%. Peer group 4 increased their 
non-interest expense by 1.31% and Peer group 5 saw the largest increase of 9.85%.
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T ab le  4: N o n -In terest E xpense*  by Peer G rou p
Peer Group 2 (%) Peer Group 3 (%) Peer Group 4 (%) Peer Group 5 (%)
2007 2.91 2.88 3.05 3.25
2008 2.96 3.05 3.07 3.45
2009 3.03 3.19 3.17 3.48
2010 2.98 3.01 3.10 3.45
2011 2.93 3.11 3.09 3.57
Overall A% 0.69% 7.99% 1.31% 9.85%
*As a percent of Average Assets
Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov
Graph 2: Non-Interest Expense* by Peer Group
*as a percent of Average Assets
Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov
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These large variations between peer groups are hard to explain, even by the FDIC in a 
report conducted on this very topic. The FDIC’s report shows that the data available through Call 
Reports and other regulatory filings do not provide a breakdown of regulatory versus other types 
of noninterest expenses (“FDIC Community Banking Study”). Furthermore, the presidents of 
those community banks interviewed discussed that although no one regulation or practice had a 
significant effect on their institution, the cumulative effects of regulatory requirements led them 
to increase staff over the past ten years. This indicates that overall the claim of massive increases 
in non-interest expense is speculative. The data here could simply suggest that the regulation 
increase from Dodd-Frank being implemented two years ago, was enough for certain peer groups 
to handle. For others, like Peer groups 3 and 5, those banks may have needed increases in staff or 
use outside consultants to tackle the challenge of this additional compliance. This especially can 
be seen in Peer group 5, which contains the smallest of banks, and is hit the hardest. In this case, 
it seems that not enough time has passed since Dodd-Frank was made law to truly see the 
changes to Non-Interest expense. The interviews indicated that it would be costly in itself to 
collect more detailed information about regulatory costs (“FDIC Community Banking Study”). 
Therefore, the data collected here cannot support nor undermine the claim made in the FDIC 
Community Banking Study.
Loans
The report by the American Bankers Association stated, as in the previous section, that 
higher regulatory capital requirements means banks need more equity funding versus debt 
funding. With equity being more expensive than debt, this could limit the number of loans that
12 •
Amy Rivers
small community banks can afford to make. The report by the ABA even states that “some 
community banks may stop providing mortgages altogether as the requirements and compliance 
costs make such a service unreasonable without considerable volume” (“Dodd-Frank and 
Community Banks”). For this portion, Gross Loans and Leases are studied to find if  this 
statement could be supported or not.
Table 5 and Graph 3 show that all targeted peer groups saw an overall decrease in Net 
Loans and Leases. Each peer group saw a decrease between 25% and 29%, suggesting that the 
decrease is unaffected by the size of total assets. Since each peer group has decreased Net Loans 
and Leases, this data reinforces the claim made by the American Bankers Association.
Interestingly, there are common types of loans that have all significantly decreased for 
each targeted peer group. Table 6 reveals the overall percentage change for all types of loans 
from 2007 to 2011 for each peer group. Although other loans have also diminished, the hardest 
impacted loans include: Construction and Land Development loans, Loans to Individuals, and 
Credit Card loans. Construction and Land Development decreased the most between 2007 and 
2011 with an average decrease o f 53.98% across the targeted peer groups; and lastly, Loans to 
Individuals decreased 21.65% on average for the peer groups; Lastly, Credit Card loans 
decreased an average o f 14.24% across the peer groups. These loans could be the explanation for 
the common decrease overall in Gross Loans and Leases for each targeted peer group.
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T ab le  5: G ross L oans and  L eases* by Peer G rou p
Peer Group 2 (%) Peer Group 3 (%) Peer Group 4 (%) Peer Group 5 (%)
2007 7.63 7.82 7.82 8.01
2008 6.4 6.58 6.69 6.77
2009 5.66 5.79 6.03 5.87
2010 5.55 5.79 5.9 5.88
2011 5.65 5.66 5.78 5.68
Overall A% -25.95% -27.62% -26.09% -29.09%
*As a percent of Average Assets
Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov
Table 6: Overall Percentage Change of Loan Mix* from 2007 to 2011 by Peer Group
Peer Group 2 Peer Group 3 Peer Group 4 Peer Group 5
Real Estate Loans -0.03% -0.51% 1.71% 5.42%
RE Loans Secured by 1-4 Family 8.58% 16.13% 13.37% 1.68%
Revolving 11.78% 34.32% 17.32% 49.67%
Closed-End 8.60% 12.33% 11.86% -6.19%
Commercial Real Estate Loans -2.00% -9.08% -5.08% 8.99%
Construction and Land Dev -51.56% -61.41% -50.81% -52.14%
Multifamily 46.61% 45.87% 31.25% 137.95%
Nonfarm Nonresidential 27.16% 23.68% 20.31% 36.58%
RE Loans Secured by Farmland 42.72% 38.82% 29.28% 2.98%
Commercial and Industrial Loans -2.45% -0.71% -8.49% -16.60%
Loans to Individuals -10.20% -19.30% -21.52% -35.60%
Credit Card Loans -12.50% -16.67% -11.11% -16.67%
Agricultural Loans 28.38% 26.97% 17.52% -29.69%
Other Loans and Leases 12.41% 5.56% 17.43% -26.15%
*As a percent of Gross Loans and Leases
Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov
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Return on Equity
Bone. Reynolds, and Griesbeck claim that banks with less than $500 million in assets 
would see Return on Equity decrease to 6-8%, which is well below the normal returns of 11-14% 
(Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck). Peer group 5 is the only peer group that has total assets of less 
than $500 million; all other peer groups have a higher level of total assets. However, all peer 




T ab le  7: R eturn  on E quity  by Peer G rou p
Peer Group 2 (%) Peer Group 3 (%) Peer Group 4 (%) Peer Group 5 (%)
2007 9.97 3.76 2.55 9.26
2008 -0.36 0.54 0.83 -1.13
2009 -2.07 -1.34 -0.37 -21.28
2010 2.75 0.76 0.62 -6.02
2011 7.69 2.14 1.25 -5.59
Overall A% -22.78% -43.14% -50.96% -160.37%
Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov
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In 2007, community banks were in an acceptable state for ROE. In 2008, their ROE 
dropped significantly, no doubt from the financial crisis and also from low, and in some cases, 
negative Net Incomes. In 2009, they continue to see decreases in ROE, although community 
banks, those with less than $500 million in assets, suffer the most. Out o f all the Peer groups, 
Peer group 5’s Net Income is the lowest and cannot handle the pressures from the financial 
crisis. Table 7 shows Peer group 5 with an ROE level of -21.28% in 2009. 2010 and 2011 
represent recovery years. This table shows how Peer groups 2, 3, and 4 are back to seeing 
positive Returns on Equity. The smallest of the community banks, however, are still seeing 
negative ROEs. Recall that Table 3 showed Peer group 5 was experiencing declining capital 
ratios. For ROE to decrease, Net Income would have had to be negative.
It’s important to note here the flaws associated with Return on Equity. First, there are 
issues with measuring Return on Equity because o f the different equations one could use when 
determining ROE. In this case, the standard Net Income divided by Shareholder’s Equity was 
used. It is unclear the formula used in the study conducted by Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck. 
One example variation could include using average shareholder’s equity versus end-of-the- 
period shareholder’s equity. Other issues include certain cases where, for example, the bank 
carries a larger amount debt in comparison to equity. If this bank chooses to raise funds through 
borrowing, rather than issuing stock, it will reduce its book value. This lower book value means 
a falsely higher ROE because you’re dividing by a smaller number. Another instance could 
include stock buy backs; this also could produce a higher ROE without any improvement in the 
bank’s profits. Most advise to use other ratios besides ROE to get a full picture. To expand on 
this analysis, ROA was also calculated. The results are seen Table 8.
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In this case, ROA for each targeted Peer group matches the results from ROE, although 
the decreases in ROA are smaller than seen in ROE. With ROA and ROE nearly matching, the 
results from ROE are accredited.
T a b le  8: R eturn  on A ssets  by Peer G rou p
Peer Group 2 (%) Peer Group 3 (%) Peer Group 4 (%) Peer Group 5 (%)
2007 0.92% 0.33% 0.22% 0.83%
2008 -0.03% 0.04% 0.07% -0.09%
2009 -0.20% -0.11% -0.03% -1.45%
2010 0.28% 0.07% 0.05% -0.42%
2011 0.85% 0.20% 0.12% -0.39%
Overall A% -7.07% -37.23% -48.56% -146.59%
Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov
It’s possible that this data reinforces the claim by Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck that the 
Dodd-Frank Act would significantly harm ROE for the smallest of community banks. In Table 
7, Return on Equity by Peer Group, you can see the overall changes in ROE from 2007 to 2011. 
It’s true that as the banks reduce in size, based on their total assets, the reduction in ROE 
increases. Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck estimated ROE levels would decrease to 6-8%, but 
certainly not into the negatives. One possible explanation for this significant decrease is Net 
Income for each targeted peer group also significantly decreased, affecting the ROE formula.
The overall percentage change of Net Income for each targeted Peer group is shown in Table 9.
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Table 9: Net Income* by Peer Group
Peer Group 2 (%) Peer Group 3 (%) Peer Group 4 (%) Peer Group 5 (%)
2007 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.84
2008 -0.03 0.13 0.28 -0.08
2009 -0.18 -0.33 -0.13 -1.35
2010 0.25 0.2 0.23 -0.38
2011 0.8 0.62 0.52 -0.31
Overall A% -8.05% -30.34% -42.86% -136.90%
*As a percent of Average Assets
Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov
Peer group 2 had a reduction in Net Income from 2007 to 2011 of 8.05%; Peer group 3 
had a decrease of 30.34%; Peer group 4 decreased by 42.86%; and Peer group 5 was impacted 
the hardest with a decrease of 136.90% from 2007 to 2011. Not surprisingly, the smaller the 
bank in terms of total assets, the larger reduction in their Net Income. The prediction made by 
Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck of the reduction in ROEs appears supported. However, their 
prediction of the extent of damage cannot. This might imply that the damage is more from the 
financial crisis than from the Dodd-Frank Act.
Current State of the Dodd-Frank Act
The government decided that the cost of additional regulation for the banks is justified by 
the benefits of a safe and stable financial system. Even if the cost of additional regulation is 
passed onto them, consumers would probably agree with the Government. Consumers know they 
would suffer far greater with another financial crisis than to pay a few additional charges every
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month for their checking account. However, this can only be successfully argued if  the additional 
regulation was, indeed, encouraging a safer and more stable financial system.
With Dodd-Frank only two and a half years old, it is still uncertain what the long term 
benefits and consequences will be. According to data compiled by the law firm Davis Polk, 
regulators are currently only about 37 percent finished with the rulemaking involved with Dodd- 
Frank (“Dodd-Frank Progress Report”). Former FDIC chief Sheila Bair and Lloyd Blankfein, the 
chief executive of Goldman Sachs, recognize how slow the progress o f Dodd-Frank has been. 
Bair stated that the reforms are “drowning in a sea o f complexity” and added that “regulators 
charged with carrying out the rules aren't doing their job in a muscular enough way” (Liberto). 
Blankfein agreed: “A lot o f Dodd-Frank, as a bill, was skeletal and a lot o f the very, very 
important details were left to the regulatory process” (Liberto). Blankfein also added that “the 
regulators themselves are having problems coming to the right conclusions and filing those in” 
(Liberto).
This growing complexity is costly. Major deadlines have been missed, slowing the 
progress even further and forcing some to truly question whether Dodd-Frank is really the 
solution it set out to be. According to the monthly report conducted by Davis Polk that came out 
April 1st, 2013:
• A total o f279 Dodd-Frank rulemaking requirement deadlines have passed.
• Of these 279passed deadlines, 176 (63.1%) have been missed and 103 
(36.9%) have been met with finalized rules.
•  In addition, 148 (37.2%) of the 398 total required rulemakings have been 






In theory, the Dodd-Frank Act gives us financial stability with the costs of additional 
regulation. In practice, however, further research is needed to determine if Dodd-Frank is 
completing what it set out to do and to see what effects it will have on community banks. At only 
two and a half years old, Dodd-Frank is still in its infancy. In terms of available data, that leaves 
us with only two years, truly not enough to set trends. In the trends we do see, it’s not always 
possible to separate what is being caused by Dodd-Frank and what is being caused by effects felt 
from the Financial Crisis. As we watch it unfold and analyze the impacts of this regulation fully, 
it becomes obvious further research is required to see the long term consequences and benefits of 
Dodd-Frank, especially on community banks, as to whether it created that safe and stable 
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